Xi Jinping Tightens Loyalty Screen as CCP Prepares for Its 21st National Congress: Insiders

Insiders say Beijing is vetting officials across Party and military systems, with political loyalty overtaking performance as the key criterion for promotion.
Published: 6/20/2026, 5:10:39 PM EDT
Xi Jinping Tightens Loyalty Screen as CCP Prepares for Its 21st National Congress: Insiders
Security stand at the entrance before the closing session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, China, on March 11, 2026. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)

As the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) begins preparations for its 21st National Congress next year, Chinese leader Xi Jinping is intensifying efforts to reshape the Party’s senior ranks, with political loyalty emerging as the dominant criterion for promotion and retention, according to insiders.

Several insiders from within the regime told The Epoch Times that the CCP has recently used the Party’s organizational apparatus, internal disciplinary mechanisms, and military anti-corruption system to screen senior officials across the Party, government, and military. The effort, they said, is aimed not only at removing officials accused of misconduct but also at sidelining those suspected of insufficient loyalty to Xi, even when no clear evidence of wrongdoing exists. They spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisal.

The personnel review process could ultimately influence the composition of both the CCP’s next Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Party body that oversees the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to the insiders.

The campaign reflects a broader shift in the Chinese regime since Xi secured an unprecedented third term at the CCP’s 20th National Congress in 2022. With no clear successor designated, leadership succession has remained unresolved, while factional competition within the Party has increasingly centered on Xi’s personal authority and political security.
Under those conditions, insiders say, assessments of officials’ governing abilities have become secondary to judgments about their political reliability.

Loyalty Screening Across the Party-State

An insider familiar with internal CCP operations told The Epoch Times the current process is more than a routine personnel reshuffle ahead of a Party congress.

“[This] is essentially a political review and reorganization,” he said.

According to the insider, some officials are being retired because of age, while others are being removed after being deemed politically unreliable despite the absence of formal disciplinary findings.

“There are people who publicly express loyalty but whose actions are not considered loyal,” he said. “Those individuals are viewed as unreliable and are also being pushed out.”

The insider said preparations for the 21st National Congress have already been underway for more than a year, with personnel changes taking place across key party institutions.

He pointed to a series of leadership shifts, including the transfer of Li Ganjie from the CCP’s powerful Organization Department to the United Front Work Department, the appointment of Shi Taifeng to head the Organization Department, and the recent move that saw Cai Qi, director of the CCP General Office, also assume leadership of the Central Party School.

According to the insider, the military remains the least settled area of the leadership structure.

“The most unstable part right now is the CMC,” he said. “The distribution of power is still being adjusted repeatedly, and the final lineup has not yet been determined.”

Military Leadership Remains in Flux

The PLA has remained a major focus of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign and political restructuring efforts.

A PLA insider told The Epoch Times that evaluating officers’ political loyalty has become one of the biggest challenges facing the leadership.

“The [regime] wants to strengthen the principle that the Party commands the gun,” he said. “But many of the people who commanded the military in previous decades have already been removed. Promoting new people is not simply a matter of looking at their current performance, and examining their past relationships creates another set of problems.”

The PLA insider said much of the previous CMC leadership team has already been removed or sidelined. If officers promoted by former military leaders are also purged, he warned, the military could face operational difficulties.

“The military purge has run into the problem of how to evaluate loyalty,” he said.

Recent developments suggest that political reliability remains central to Beijing’s approach.

In May, a Chinese court martial sentenced former defense ministers Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu on bribery-related charges. Both received suspended death sentences that would be commuted to life imprisonment without parole.
The following day, state media PLA Daily published a front-page commentary emphasizing the need to combat corruption without exception. Later in the month, state mouthpiece People’s Daily reported that the CMC had issued a new set of measures strengthening supervision and ideological education for senior military officers. The regulations covered areas including political education, collective leadership, cadre management, and oversight of top commanders.

Purges Could Shape the Next Military Leadership

The PLA insider said military personnel decisions carry significance beyond internal organizational matters because control of the armed forces remains central to political power in China.
Since the 20th Party Congress, a series of investigations involving the PLA Rocket Force, military procurement, and CMC-affiliated organizations have highlighted Xi’s ongoing insecurities about loyalty within the military establishment.

“The issue is not simply military personnel management,” the PLA insider said. “It is about who will sit on the next CMC and who will control the gun after the 21st National Congress.”

A China-based scholar told The Epoch Times that the more important question ahead of the congress may not be who rises into the next leadership team, but who disappears from the political system beforehand.

“Xi is rebuilding a personnel system that answers only to him personally,” the scholar said. “He is doing it through three channels—the Party School, the Organization Department, and military anti-corruption campaigns.”

If the military purge continues to expand, he said, the next CMC lineup could undergo major changes.

According to the scholar, preliminary personnel arrangements for the 21st Party Congress could begin taking shape before China’s annual rubber-stamp congressional meetings next March, with the composition of the military leadership expected to be a key issue.

The two insiders and the scholar have all said that the continuing military purge has already affected the stability of the PLA’s command structure, equipment systems, and leadership planning. They said the campaign could also have implications for Beijing’s longer-term military ambitions.

Xue Xiaoguang contributed to this report.