Xi Silent as Iran Names Khamenei’s Son Supreme Leader, Exposing Beijing’s Dilemma

Beijing avoided congratulating Iran’s new supreme leader after clerics selected Mojtaba Khamenei to succeed his father—a decision analysts say reflects Xi Jinping’s effort to avoid friction with U.S. President Donald Trump.
Published: 3/14/2026, 11:45:40 PM EDT
Xi Silent as Iran Names Khamenei’s Son Supreme Leader, Exposing Beijing’s Dilemma
Chinese leader Xi Jinping leaves the podium after speaking in Hong Kong on June 30, 2022. (Selim Chtayti/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)
News Analysis
After Iran’s leadership named Mojtaba Khamenei supreme leader following the killing of his father, Ali Khamenei, in the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Feb. 28, Russian President Vladimir Putin quickly congratulated him, pledging Russia’s “unwavering support” for Tehran in a March 9 telegram, the Kremlin said.

Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping did not offer congratulations.

Instead, Beijing responded cautiously. China’s foreign ministry said on March 9 that Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection was an internal Iranian decision under the country’s constitution and warned against outside interference or targeting the new leader.

The contrast with Moscow’s response was notable. Putin also quickly expressed condolences over Khamenei’s death. China’s condolences were delivered more quietly: Vice Foreign Minister Miao Deyu visited the Iranian embassy in Beijing on March 5 to express sympathy, according to China’s foreign ministry.

The restrained response drew attention from analysts who suggested that Beijing may be trying to balance its longstanding ties with Tehran while avoiding friction with Washington.

Trump In the Background

Chinese officials publicly defended Iran’s sovereignty and called for a ceasefire. But at nearly the same moment, Foreign Minister Wang Yi was signaling how much Beijing values its relationship with Washington.

Speaking during China’s annual parliamentary session on March 8, Wang called 2026 a potential “big year” for U.S.–China relations. He said preparations for high-level exchanges were already underway and urged both sides to create the right atmosphere and to remove “unnecessary disruptions.”

In a March 12 analysis for Nikkei Asia, Tokyo-based columnist Katsuji Nakazawa said Xi appeared “torn between long ties with the Khameneis and U.S. relations.” He said Xi may be wary of appearing too closely aligned with Tehran as U.S. President Donald Trump considers visiting Beijing from March 31 to April 2 and has already expressed “disappointment” with Mojtaba Khamenei’s selection.
The question, Nakazawa wrote, is not whether Beijing values its relationship with Iran, but whether Xi can openly embrace that partnership without risking something he appears to prioritize more at the moment: stabilizing relations with Washington.

A Partner Beijing Could Not Fully Back

Relations between Beijing and the Khamenei family date back to at least 1989, when Ali Khamenei visited China as a senior Iranian leader—a trip Nakazawa says helped cement military and political ties between the two countries.

Since then, China has supplied arms and dual-use materials to Iran, while Iran has sold large amounts of sanctioned crude oil to China. The relationship deepened further in 2021, when Wang Yi signed a 25-year cooperation agreement with Tehran covering energy, infrastructure, and strategic cooperation.

An analysis published by the news website Eurasia Review said China has cultivated close ties with countries that challenge Western influence, but those partnerships rarely come with security guarantees or military commitments. When crises escalate, Beijing often limits its role to diplomatic statements and calls for restraint.

Those relationships emphasize economic cooperation and diplomatic coordination, allowing Beijing to benefit from them while avoiding the risks of direct military involvement.

Nakazawa said Xi’s response reflects the complexity of China’s “major power diplomacy,” a strategy that seeks to maintain ties with rival powers at the same time. That balancing act becomes far more difficult when crises force Beijing to signal where it stands.

Beijing Left Looking Reactive

Some analysts say the episode has made China appear more reactive and strategically constrained.
Overseas political commentator Chen Pokong told The Epoch Times’ Chinese-language edition that the Mojtaba Khamenei succession exposed what he sees as the limits of Beijing’s power. China has deep ties with Iran and frequently emphasizes sovereignty and non-interference, but when the crisis forced a choice between solidarity with Tehran and stability with Washington, Chen said Xi appeared to prioritize relations with the United States.

From Chen’s perspective, Beijing’s restraint looked less like prudence than softness toward Washington, a sign, he said, that Xi wanted a meeting with Trump badly enough to accept the optics of appearing hesitant toward Tehran.

That, Chen said, left Beijing looking weak and reactive rather than strategic: China could neither fully back a longtime partner nor openly challenge the U.S.–Israeli escalation.

Chinese officials would likely reject that interpretation. From Beijing’s perspective, the response reflects consistent diplomatic principles, including non-interference and calls for de-escalation, rather than hesitation.

Still, the handling of Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession underscores the competing pressures shaping China’s foreign policy. As Beijing tries to preserve ties with Tehran while stabilizing relations with Washington, the episode highlights how difficult it can be for Xi to manage both priorities at once.