Former Chinese Armed Police Member Details Corruption and Abuse in the Force

As Beijing projects military strength, a former member of a paramilitary force says corruption and abuse point to deeper problems inside China’s broader armed system.

Xiaohua Li

Published: 3/28/2026, 4:57:19 AM EDT

Former Chinese Armed Police Member Details Corruption and Abuse in the Force — China's People's Liberation Army officers stand in front of a window before a welcome ceremony for U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley at the Bayi Building in Beijing on Aug. 16, 2016. (Mark Schiefelbein/Pool/AFP via Getty Images)

A former member of China’s People’s Armed Police is accusing the country’s security forces of deep-rooted corruption and abuse, describing a system in which rank-and-file personnel went hungry, military fuel was siphoned off for cash, and new recruits were routinely beaten. The former serviceman, who identified himself only as “Sam,” said the rot he witnessed reflected broader problems across China’s armed system and had left the military, in his view, “incapable of taking Taiwan by force.”

In a recent interview with Taiwanese influencer Pa Chiung, Sam described what he said he witnessed while serving in China’s far-western Xinjiang region in 1998.

His claims could not be independently verified. But his account points to what he portrayed as a culture of graft that has plagued China’s security forces for decades—one that still resonates as recent corruption scandals and military purges fuel doubts about whether Beijing’s image of strength masks deeper weaknesses.

The People’s Armed Police is a paramilitary force that operates alongside the country’s military within its broader armed system.

Sam said he came under pressure from Chinese state security authorities after taking part in protests in China. He fled the country with his son in 2023 and later received political asylum in the United States, according to the interview.

Corruption and Abuse Inside the Force

Sam said he did not join out of patriotism. For many rural families in China, he said, joining the force was seen as a path to stable employment and a way out of poverty.

Instead, he found a system where money shaped nearly every step inside the force, from political advancement to job assignments. “In 1998, joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) cost 500 yuan,” he said. “If you had no money, you couldn’t do anything there.”

Meal budgets were skimmed, he said, better food was diverted to commanders and rank-and-file personnel were left with scraps. “Our meal budget was a little more than seven yuan per meal, and nearly half was taken,” he said. “How can a force that can’t even eat enough fight a war?”

Fuel theft was also common, according to Sam. After paying to get into a vehicle unit, he said, he witnessed a mobilization drill in which troops assembled on time, but the vehicles could not move because the fuel had already been sold off.

Abuse of new recruits was routine, he said, and he himself was beaten after refusing to lend money to a platoon leader. Some recruits suffered mental breakdowns or tried to flee, only to be caught and jailed as deserters.

Sam said the trauma has stayed with him. “Sometimes I still jolt awake at night feeling like I’m back in the army, running laps,” he said.

A Wider Challenge to Beijing’s Military Image

Sam said the corruption he witnessed inside the force also extended to weapons and equipment.

He said China’s military strength often appears stronger on paper than in reality, with corruption and falsification widespread in the defense system. Better-quality weapons were often reserved for export, he said, where foreign buyers demanded inspection, while domestic equipment faced weaker scrutiny as long as superiors were satisfied.

He pointed to recent corruption cases in China’s military and defense sector, including investigations involving senior defense officials linked to the J-20 stealth fighter program and the Rocket Force, as signs of a broader pattern of cover-ups and falsification.

Sam said those problems go directly to combat readiness. He said Beijing lacks the military capability to take Taiwan by force, and that its real strength lies instead in information warfare, intimidation, and united front tactics.

Comments posted under the interview echoed some of his allegations. Several users identifying themselves as former service members or people familiar with the system said his account matched what they had seen, citing fuel theft, bribery, and other informal practices.

Sam’s service was not recent, but that may be part of why his account stands out. If the scandals and purges surfacing today echo what he described from 1998, his account may point to a deeper, longer-running problem rather than isolated cases—and add to broader questions about whether Beijing’s projected image of discipline, readiness, and strength fully reflects conditions inside the system.